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1The Analysis of Tying
Cases: A Primer
Jean Tirole
This primer analyzes factors that make ties more likely either to hurt or tobenefit consumers. It first identifies factors that influence where the
impact of tying on competition in the tied market stands, ranging from little
impact on the rivals’ ability to compete to total exclusion of competitors.
Then, after reviewing anticompetitive and efficiency-enhancing motives for
tying, it argues that tying should be submitted to a rule of reason standard.
Furthermore, tying should not be a distinct offense but considered as one pos-
sible mechanism of predation. Like many other corporate strategies that make
one’s products attractive to consumers, tying has the potential of hurting com-
petitors, and, therefore, is just one in a large range of strategies that can be
employed to prey on them. Finally, the primer discusses the costs and benefits
of adopting a predation-based standard.
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I. Introduction
A large number of antitrust investigations in the United States and Europe1
relate to various kinds of tying behavior by firms with market power.2 For exam-
ple, a highly visible U.S. case, resulting in the largest settlement in antitrust his-
tory, concerned Visa and MasterCard’s tie of debit and credit cards; the two asso-
ciations agreed in 2003 to pay $2 billion and $1 billion, respectively, to a class of
merchants and to lower their interchange fees.
While one may lament the existence of market power in the tying market, it
does not necessarily follow that the tying action hurts consumers. This primer
analyzes factors that make ties more likely either to hurt or to benefit consumers.
It does not provide a turnkey methodology that would enable competition
authorities to determine mechanically and unambiguously the impact of a tie; its
more limited objective is to list a set of relevant considerations that must be care-
fully examined before forming a judgment.
This paper argues that tying is likely to be systematically harmful to consumers
when it is a tool of predatory action, and should not be treated as a separate
offense. It is important, therefore, to make the analysis of the consequences of
tying consistent with what we know about predation and the circumstances
under which it represents a realistic threat to healthy competition.
Figure 1 suggests a natural checklist for the antitrust analysis of tying cases,
building (with some nuances) on a three-step procedure that is familiar in
antitrust reasoning.3 The three steps hardly require elaboration. Note, though,
that the antitrust doctrine has long recognized that we should be more interest-
ed in protecting consumers (step 2) than in protecting competitors (step 1), or
to put it differently, that competition is often a means to enhance consumer wel-
fare, but in no way an end.4 Indeed, the main reason for being interested in step
1 is as a way of thinking about possible causes of harm to consumers.
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1 In the European Community, tying cases are treated under Article 82(d) of the EC Treaty, which states
that an abuse by a dominant firm may consist in “making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”
2 See generally Barry Nalebuff, Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects, Parts 1 and 2, DEPT. OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY ECON. PAPER 1 (2003) (discussing some of the court cases in detail).
3 To see the link between this three-step approach and the standard treatment of tying cases under
Article 82(d) of the EC treaty, note that step 1 corresponds to the identification of a restrictive impact
on competition in the tied good market, and step 2 in part to the question of the existence of an
“objective and proportionate justification” for the tie. The identification of a dominant position in the
market for the tying product bears both on steps 1 and 2: A dominant position increases the restric-
tive effect on competition in the tied market and makes it more likely that the tying firm later recoups
its losses if the intent is indeed anticompetitive.
4 One can argue, though, that the standard treatment of tying cases fails to satisfy this basic precept, since
it usually contents itself with a demonstration that competition in the tied market is foreclosed (step 1).
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The paper’s organization follows this checklist. It first delineates circumstances
under which a tie is likely or unlikely to reduce competition in the tied market
(step 1). Three key characteristics of the tied market are emphasized: unit pro-
duction costs, scope for differentiation, and multi-sidedness (a multi-sided mar-
ket is one in which firms are successful only if they get on board multiple cate-
gories of users who want to interact with each other).
The analysis then proceeds to step 2, where the focus is on developing a series
of reasons why ties may benefit or hurt consumers. In particular, ties are likely to
enhance consumer welfare when they reduce distribution costs, lower the cost of
ensuring compatibility, enhance accountability if a product malfunctions, are
necessary to protect intellectual property, and are competitive responses; they
have ambiguous effects when they are employed for price discrimination purpos-
es; and they are anticompetitive when they aim at monopolizing the competitive
segment or at protecting the monopoly segment. Consequently, the impact of
tying by a dominant firm is best assessed under the rule of reason standard.5
I then argue that it is difficult to think of reasons that tying should be a dis-
tinct offense (distinct, that is, from a more general offense of predation or the
broader concept of monopolization/abuse of dominant position). The reason for
concern about tying by a dominant firm is that tying serves more to hurt and
eliminate rivals from the tied market than to enhance efficiency in the ways list-
ed above. Tying is one of the many strategies that dominant firms can employ for
anticompetitive reasons. Low prices, investment, and patent accumulation are
other examples of such strategies; like tying, these strategies are often motivated
by efficiency reasons that also benefit consumers, but they are sometimes mis-
used. This suggests that tying cases should be analyzed as predation cases. Step 1
indeed relates to a standard step in predation cases: Is the strategy likely to dis-
courage rivals (i.e. inducing their exit or discouraging their entry)? Step 2 speaks
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5 For calls for a rule of reason treatment and for alternative, but related checklists to deal with tying
cases, see C. Ahlborn, D. Evans, & J. Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per se
Illegality, 49 ANTITRUST BULLETIN, 287-341 (2004) and D. Evans & M. Salinger, Why do Firms Bundle and
Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 21 YALE J. REG. (2004).
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to the question of whether the dominant firm employs the strategy to raise its
profit or to impose losses on itself and its rivals and, therefore, trigger the rivals’
exit. If the latter, the analysis may be completed by a recoupment test, investi-
gating whether the dominant firm is likely to make up through future monopoly
power the shortfall in profit associated with the predatory act.
II. A Few Definitions
To fix ideas, consider the following simplified setting of Figure 2, which we will
later enrich as needed. There are two segments, the monopolized and the poten-
tially competitive ones. An integrated firm is the sole producer of the monopoly
good (M) and has its own offering (C) in the competitive or adjacent market.
Independent producers are also present in the competitive market and have offer-
ing C′ that competes with C. Goods C and C′ are valueless unless combined with
M; M may or may not have a stand-alone value when not combined with C or C′.
A. DEFINING EQUAL ACCESS
1. Complete Foreclosure
The integrated firm forecloses the competitive segment if it makes it impossible
for C′ to operate. For example, a durable good producer may demand exclusivity
and prohibit buyers of the durable good (M) from using independent service
operators (ISOs) for after-sale services (C′); alternatively, it may refrain from
communicating technical specifications to manufacturers of spare parts, prevent-
ing them from building compatible components. 
2. Technological Equal Access
We define equal access in technological rather than commercial terms: C and C′
have equal access to M if integrated and independent producers in the comple-
mentary segment, producing C and C′, respectively, can produce functionally
Jean Tirole
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equivalent products, provided that they have similar talents and sink compara-
ble investments. Put differently, C and C′ may differ due to their designers’
expertise or R&D budgets, their design option or just chance, but not because
the integrated producer has privileged access to or knowledge about specific
functions or interfaces of M.
Two questions arise about equal access in this technological sense. First, is it
desirable? A simple example suffices to show that the answer is not always
“yes”—everything depends on costs.6 Even in the absence of favoritism or cor-
ruption in the refereeing process, French-speaking economists have an edge for
publishing in French-speaking economics journals over non-French-speaking
economists, who, among other things, must translate their work at each step of
the submission process. Ensuring equal access, in which each would have an
equal chance of publication for a given effort, would require the journals to
accept submissions in other languages and to offer a free but excellent translation
of all submitted papers. This rather inconsequential example illustrates a more
general point: different firms inherit or select different approaches or technolog-
ical options. Ensuring equally effective internal and external interoperability
requires an effort on both sides. Even leaving aside the question of whether inter-
operability is worth this effort, antitrust authorities face the difficult technologi-
cal challenge of trying to figure out the least costly way of achieving it.
Meanwhile the integrated firm and its competitors are each trying to shift the
burden of achieving compatibility to the other side.
The second question about technological equal access is whether it implies that
C and C′ are equally likely to succeed in the competitive market. Once again, the
answer is “no”—even when the offerings are similar and the integrated firm has
no anticompetitive intent. Other things being equal, C is more likely to take the
upper hand in that market despite technological equal access, because of the com-
plementarities between the two products. A lower price for C boosts the demand
for M, and thus the integrated firm has more incentive to charge a low price in
the competitive market than the independent one, which does not internalize the
beneficial impact of a reduction in the price of C′ on consumer demand for M.7
Note that the integrated firm would benefit from a reduction in the price of rival
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6 This example is one related to “vertical exclusion” (in which one of the two complementary goods is
not sold to consumers). For a discussion (although its jest carries over to “horizontal exclusion”), see
P. Rey & J. Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (M. Armstrong and
R.H. Porter, eds) (forthcoming).
7 See, e.g., J. Farrell & M. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in System Markets, 48 J.
INDUS. ECON. 413, 413-432 (2000) for an analysis of the classic “Cournot effect”, according to which
integration reduces the overall price. So, for example a software platform vendor will price internally
developed applications more aggressively than rival application developers. This differential in incen-
tives is however alleviated by the durability of the monopolized product, since a reduction in the price
of applications or after-sale services does nothing to boost the (past) demand constituting the
installed base.
8 As usual, things are more complex than suggested by this “benchmark reasoning”. First, the reason-
ing clearly rests on the integrated firm’s wooing a customer away from its downstream rivals. That is,
there is a one-for-one substitution. While this assumption is fine in a world of perfect competition
with undifferentiated products or in an Hotelling model of price competition with differentiated goods,
more generally a competitive action by the integrated firm also has a demand expansion effect. Then,
an extra unit sold by the downstream affiliate corresponds to a reduction of volume sold in the whole-
sale market of less than one. For a general analysis along those lines, see J. Gans and S. King,
Competitive Neutrality in Access Pricing, University of Melbourne (mimeograph, 2004). They show
that, for integration not to drive any differences in competitive behavior between the downstream
affiliate of the integrated firm and its non-integrated downstream rivals, the marginal access price
must be equal to the marginal cost of giving access. As they point out, this is easily seen in the
extreme case of Cournot (quantity) competition with perfect symmetry (except for integration) down-
stream.
To see this, let q and q′ denote the outputs of C and C′, P(q + q′) be the inverse demand function,
and c the marginal cost of access. Then C′ has profit q′[P(q + q′) – a] and C has profit q[P(q + q′) – c]
+ (a – c)q’. The first-order conditions are:
q′(dP/dQ) + P = a for C′, and
q(dP/dQ) + P = c for C
So q = q′ if and only if the access price is a pass-through (a = c).
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good C′. Complementarity gives the integrated firm no reason to wish that its
own price be lower than the rival’s—the asymmetry results from the fact that it
has the power to set its own price but no power to set the rival’s.
B. ADDING ROYALTIES
While the outcome of competition in the tied market will depend on pricing
strategies in that market, it is important to note that the rivals’ market shares
may not depend on the price charged for the monopoly good M or on whether
the monopolist levies a royalty on producers of C′ for access to (or interoperabil-
ity with) M (for example, M may charge an independent content provider, a
videogame developer, or a music store per game or per song). It is sometimes
argued that the existence of such a royalty implies that producers of C and C′
face different marginal costs—since the division producing C either does not pay
such royalties or else internalizes the fact that these royalties go to an affiliated
entity—and so there is no level playing field in the adjacent market despite equal
technological access. However, this reasoning is incomplete. Royalty a levied on
each unit of the rival’s good sold to consumers (i.e. the equivalent of an access
charge to a local loop bottleneck) need not put C′ at a competitive disadvantage
relative to C (see Figure 3). While the rival’s marginal cost of production increas-
es by a, so does the integrated firm’s opportunity cost of producing C. When woo-
ing a consumer of the adjacent good away from producers of C′, the integrated
firm foregoes royalty a, and thus royalty a becomes part of the integrated firm’s
marginal cost of producing C. Hence, a royalty levied on C′, while raising the
price of C′ and C and therefore reducing demand in the adjacent segment, does
not intrinsically affect the market shares of C and C′ in this segment: it is com-
petitively neutral.8,9
Jean Tirole
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The policy of setting the access price equal to the marginal cost of access however ignores what
is often the very reason for the existence of the upstream bottleneck: the existence of fixed costs to be
recouped in downstream markets. Laffont and Tirole characterize socially optimal access prices in a
variety of environments; these access prices usually exceed marginal costs, and deliver equal market
shares for C and C′ in “symmetric cases”, but not in other cases (asymmetric qualities, entrant market
power, and so forth). Optimal prices can be approximated through a global price cap. See Jean-
Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Access Pricing and Competition, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 1673, 1673-1710
(1994) and Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Creating Competition Through Interconnection:
Theory and Practice, 10 J. REGULATORY ECON. 227, 227-256 (1996).
9 A different issue arises when regulators or antitrust authorities try to regulate the rate of return on
the monopoly segment. This regulation rests on the view that M is an essential facility, that is an infra-
structure owned and controlled by a dominant firm, that is extremely costly to duplicate, and for
which foreclosure is the main reason why the dominant firm denies access (see AT&T v. MCI, 708 F.2d
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891); and that this essential facility, absent regu-
lation, would make an excessive rate of return, that is not in relation to investment or innovation. The
corollary is then the design of access policies, such as the regulation of access price and quality, and
the attempt to define interoperability.
This confers no easy task on competition policy officials. While their counterparts (e.g., the commis-
sioners) in regulatory agencies lament informational asymmetries with the firms they regulate, competi-
tion policy officials cannot even avail themselves of the large staff and permanent data collection of
these agencies. Yet, they have to answer complex questions such as: In which segments should plat-
form M’s fixed costs be recouped? What is a reasonable rate of return on investments in the presence
of technological and commercial uncertainty? Given that unbundling cannot be widespread, what are
the key components to be unbundled? Does unbundling forgo some efficiency gains of tying?
It is, therefore, important to understand why the argument that a royalty or access
charge puts competitors at a disadvantage resonates in many people’s mind. This is
perhaps due to the fact that a royalty, although part of the integrated firm’s margin-
al cost of producing the downstream good C, makes it possible to prey on competi-
tors without charging very low or negative prices for C. When marginal costs are
low, in the absence of a royalty and with equal technological access, an integrated
firm that seeks to prey on its rivals in the competitive market must do so through a
very low price, perhaps a negative one—which creates obvious problems of oppor-
tunistic purchases by consumers. By contrast, the integrated firm may use royalties




to squeeze competitors out of the market without having to charge low or negative
prices for C. But this reasoning has two important implications. First, the predatory
action is the excessively low price charged for C by the integrated firm, relative to
the opportunity cost of C—which, remember, embodies royalty a—not, per se, the
royalty charged by M. Secondly, the case should be analyzed as a predatory case,
with a focus on the voluntary loss of current profits by the integrated firm in the
hope of recouping this lost profit through rivals’ exit in the future.
C. DEFINING TYING
Next, recall the standard definitions of tying, bundling, joint distribution, and inte-
gration. Tying refers to the behavior of selling one product (the tying product), con-
ditional on the purchase of another product (the tied product). Bundling refers to
the practice of selling two products together. Pure bundling
means that the products are available only as a bundle. The
difference between tying and pure bundling is that the tied
product is available on a stand-alone basis under tying, but
not under pure bundling. This distinction however is
inconsequential if, as we assumed for illustrative purposes,
the tied product is valueless without the tying product.
Under mixed bundling, the products are available both on
a stand-alone basis and as a bundle; furthermore, the price
of the bundle is smaller than the sum of the two individual
prices. Pure bundling is a special case of mixed bundling,
since buying the bundle is really the only feasible option if
the prices of the individual products are high. Joint distribu-
tion of the two products describes a situation of bundling in
which the two goods are assembled by the manufacturer
rather than by the consumer. For example, cars come with
an engine, a steering wheel, and tires. Joint distribution dif-
fers from bundling if consumers incur a transaction cost
from either acquiring C independently of M or from replacing C by C′.10 Finally, all
situations may also involve integration (i.e. some interoperability between M and C
that is unavailable to C′—and therefore a lack of technological equal access). 
The notion of distinct products calls up some complex issues. In legal cases, two
products are deemed distinct if, in the absence of tying or bundling, consumers
would purchase the products separately. This obviously is a vague criterion. The act
of purchasing separately depends on pricing, delivery, guarantee, and assembly
offerings. It furthermore has conceptual drawbacks. For one thing, economic the-
ory, with its emphasis on a fine partition of goods, is of little help in drawing a line
between distinct and non-distinct products. Does the fact that Ikea or Shaker
Workshop offers their customers to pay less for furniture that they assemble them-
selves (or, in the latter case, a choice between cheap non-assembled and expensive
Jean Tirole
10 For example, C may need to be un-installed in order for C′ to be usable.
TH E N O T I O N O F D I S T I N C T
P R O D U C T S C A L L S U P S O M E
COMPLEX ISSUES. IN LEGAL CASES,
T W O P R O D U C T S A R E D E E M E D
D I S T I N C T I F, I N T H E A B S E N C E
O F T Y I N G O R B U N D L I N G,
C O N S U M E R S W O U L D P U R C H A S E
T H E P R O D U C T S S E PA R AT E LY.
TH I S O B V I O U S LY I S A VA G U E
C R I T E R I O N. . . . FU RT H E R M O R E,
S U C H A D I S T I N C T I O N R U N S T H E
R I S K O F C R E AT I N G A S Y M M E T R I C
I N C E N T I V E S F O R F I R M S.
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assembled furniture) imply that other furniture makers, who only deliver assembled
furniture engage in a tie? Economic theory would simply treat non-assembled fur-
niture as items of lower quality than assembled furniture (and, similarly, a disabled
software program as an inferior version of the fully-enabled version).11
Furthermore, such a distinction runs the risk of creating asymmetric incentives
for firms; take the case of a commercial software vendor who, when facing secu-
rity threats, has the choice between improving the code to limit the number of
weak spots and offering antivirus and firewall services. According to the defini-
tion, the latter would be considered a tie, while the former would not. However,
both options may achieve the same objective.
Leaving aside the notions of joint distribution and integration, which relate to
the notion of equal access discussed above and to which we will come back occa-
sionally in this paper, we now focus on purely commercial aspects. It is tempting
to consider bundling a form of exclusionary strategy and unbundling a form of
competition-friendly behavior. This identification might, however, be mislead-
ing. As we will see, a bundle in some circumstances may have a limited exclu-
sionary impact on competitors. Conversely, an integrated firm may be able to
easily squeeze out rivals while fully unbundling its products: To this purpose, it
may suffice to charge a very low price for C.
III. Step 1: Is Tying Likely to Reduce
Competition in the Tied Market?
First look at the impact of a tie on the ability of rivals to compete in the tied mar-
ket. Clearly, a tie tends to hurt rivals; the question is “how much?” It is impossi-
ble to define precisely the notion of reduction in competition. In practice, the
impact may range from little impact on the ability of rivals to compete to total
exclusion of competitors, with various intermediate degrees of reduction in com-
petition. At best, we can list factors that amplify or reduce the impact of a tie.
A. HOW LARGE ARE UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS? 
When two goods are tied together, the effective price for buying the second good
for a customer who has already bought the first is zero. Whether this is likely to
have predatory consequences in the market for the second good will depend,
therefore, on the marginal cost of production in that market. Consider the hypo-
thetical example of a monopoly car manufacturer, and suppose that cars come
with an engine and tires, which for the sake of the argument, have little value in
a secondhand market. Given the cost of manufacturing an engine or tires and the
concomitant prices, the consumer is unlikely to replace these components with
The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer
11 On damaged goods, see e.g., R. Deneckere & P. McAfee, Damaged Goods, 5 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
149, 149-174 (1996).
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those produced by a company not under contract with the car manufacturer,
even if technological equal access obtains. The commercial tie is then akin to a
technological foreclosure in that rival engine or tire manufacturers cannot get
access to the tied markets, since they would have to sell at a price close to zero
in order to compete with the integrated firm.
More generally, suppose a consumer purchases the bundle {M, C}. The con-
sumer may then have no demand for C′, even if the latter is better adapted to
their needs or if C′ offers superior features. When the unit marginal production
cost, and therefore the price charged by competitors, is high, the extra cost
incurred by the consumer when consuming C′ is not offset by sufficient benefits,
unless C′ has a tremendous edge over C or is sufficiently differentiated. The tie
then de facto forecloses competitors. For this reason, antitrust authorities have
traditionally considered tying a form of exclusionary behavior.
In the new economy, though, some goods, including software products, have
extremely low unit production costs—by contrast, they often involve large fixed
costs (i.e. costs that are independent of the number of customers or their usage).
Tying is then akin to selling at a price close to marginal production cost. To be
certain, and as is well-known, prices in the vicinity of marginal costs do not
allow market participants to recoup large fixed costs in such industries. In the
presence of substantial fixed costs, static competition, that is the long-run coex-
istence of multiple firms (as opposed to dynamic competition, in which firms
attempt to leapfrog each other and recoup innovation costs through temporary
monopoly positions) requires tacit collusion, capacity constraints, or differenti-
ated products; otherwise, profits must be reaped in an adjacent market. In the
absence of these conditions, competitive pricing results in a shake out and (per-
haps temporary) monopolization of the market.
B. CAN COMPETITORS DIFFERENTIATE IN THE TIED MARKET? 
For products with a low unit production cost and a large fixed cost, the fixed cost
needs to be recouped through prices above marginal costs. Suppose that M and C
come as a bundle, and that consumers can further purchase C′, and either replace
C by C′ or use C or C′ in turn, depending on the application that is being made of
the complementary product. In the case of a tie, consumers, who get C for free, will
pay for C′ only if C′ adds value, as when it is tailored to their specific needs or offers
innovative features. Note that “adding value” does not imply that C′ is superior to
C in an absolute sense. Rather, it suffices that C′ offer to some or all consumers
some features that are absent or inferior in design in C; C may dominate C′ in
other respects. Thus, a tie need not preclude competition if independent produc-
ers in the competitive market differentiate relative to the tied product.12
Jean Tirole
12 Comparisons in the extent of differentiation here refer to within market (i.e. within the tied market)
comparisons. As Miguel de la Mano pointed out to me, different comparisons can be made when M
competes with a differentiated substitute M′. If M′ is more differentiated from M than C′ is from C,
then M′ may lose more than C′ from a tie of M and C.
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C. IS THE COMPETITIVE MARKET MULTI-SIDED?
A particularly interesting special case of competitor differentiation arises in the
context of multi-sided markets, which include a large number of new and old
economy markets. Firms in such markets must get multiple sides on board in
order to be successful. They must attract both users and developers (e.g. software
and videogame industries), eyeballs and advertisers (e.g. newspapers, portals, and
TV networks), cardholders and merchants (e.g. payment systems), and so forth.13
Usually one side has no interest in the product unless the other side is also on
board. Two-sided markets are a sub-class of a broader class of markets exhibiting
network externalities (i.e. markets in which consumers are more eager to con-
sume provided other consumers also consume). Antitrust authorities are often
concerned that markets exhibiting network externalities may “tip”.14
In a two-sided market, C may be tied to M on one side of the market, but not
on the other side (see Figure 4). For example, payment systems such as Visa or
American Express usually require that merchants (S for “sellers” in Figure 4)
accept all cards issued by the system, but do not impose any tie on the consumer
side (B for “buyer” in Figure 4). Sunday newspapers, where the paper is tied with
a magazine on the consumer side, but may or may not be tied on the advertiser
side, provide another example.
The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer
13 See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N, 990-1029 (2003) and Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview
(mimeo) (2004) and references therein. Other multi-sided markets include matchmakers and market-
places (exchanges, yellow pages, on-line auctions, real estate agencies, dating agencies) and telecoms
and internet networks. For an analysis of two-sidedness in the more specific context of the software
industry, see D. Evans, A. Hagiu & R. Schmalensee, A Survey of the Economic Role of Software
Platforms in Computer-Based Industries, CES IFO working paper (2004).
14 Tipping refers to the dynamics of a market with network externalities, in which it is difficult for several
producers to coexist profitably and in which a firm with even a small edge over its rivals stands a
good chance to take the entire market.
Figure 4
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Multi-sidedness may make a difference for the ability of C′ producers to with-
stand a tie of C with M. Even if these independent producers of the competitive
good are unable to differentiate their technologies in the eyes of users (B):
• They may be able to differentiate their technology on the other side
(S), and thereby attract and make margins on that other side; 
• They may sign exclusive deals or produce their own offerings on the S
side, which differentiate them from C on the B side. Part of or all
users on the B side are then induced to own both C and C′, provided
that the cost of such “multi-homing” is small.15
Thus, unlike in a standard one-sided market, in a two-sided market in which the
cost of multi-homing for users facing the tie is small, the tie on that side of the
market need not preclude competitors from profitably competing, even when
competitors’ technology is undifferentiated from the tied technology from their
point of view.
Incidentally, a common and successful business model in two-sided markets con-
sists of giving away the product (or even paying the consumer for using the prod-
uct16) to one side of the market, and covering costs by charging the other side. Such
discrimination between the two sides, which helps attract the less eager side while
allowing firms to make a profit or at least break even overall, can be observed in a
variety of industries with or without market power: traditionally, firms make little
money or lose money on consoles (videogames), developer kits and support (soft-
ware), cardholders (payment systems), and recoup on games, licensing of software
to users, and merchants, respectively. Many software programs such as Acrobat
PDF are free to readers, but not to writers. Portals, TV networks, and newspapers
are often free of charge or sold below cost to viewers and readers, but not to adver-
tisers. Many dating agencies or nightclubs also build their business model around
such discrimination. These examples and others demonstrate that the existence of
free (or even negative) prices on one side of the market need not be conducive to
tipping, and is, in fact, consistent with vibrant competition.
The recent economics literature17 has analyzed the factors leading to such
asymmetric price structure. And, quite importantly, the literature has empha-
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15 Multi-homing refers to consumers connecting or belonging to multiple platforms. For example, mer-
chants may accept Visa and American Express cards; conversely cardholders may have both cards in
their wallets.
16 Cardholders sometimes receive cash-back bonuses or frequent flyer miles for using their card.
17 See e.g., A. Ambrus & R. Argenziano, Network Markets and Consumers Coordination (mimeograph,
Harvard University, Yale University) (2004); S. Anderson & S. Coate, Market Provision of Broadcasting:
A Welfare Analysis (Vol. forthcoming, Review of Economic Studies); Mark Armstrong, Competition in
Two-Sided Markets (mimeograph, University College, London) (2004); J. Gabszewicz & X. Wauthy,
Two-Sided Markets and Price Competition with Multi-homing (mimeograph, Université Catholique
de Louvain, 2004); and Rochet & Tirole, supra note 13.
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sized that these business models may bring good social value for the same reason
that they are profitable to firms: they enable platforms to get all sides on board,
thus creating trade and economic value. In such markets, therefore, low or zero
prices—and the tying phenomena that embody such implicit prices—are likely
to be frequently observed, and often beneficial.
D. SUMMING UP 
As in the realm of market share definitions for the purpose of identifying domi-
nant positions, it is useful to come up with measures of the percentage of the tied
market that is affected by the tying. The rationale in both
cases is to provide a screening device to competition
authorities in order to alleviate their load. As in the case
of market shares, the resulting numbers should be taken
with a grain of salt. Besides the standard difficulty of
defining markets—in this context, the tied market18—it
is important to refine what “being affected” means. For
example, does one take a usage or membership/adoption
viewpoint? Consider, for example, the case of a merchant
who contemplates dropping payment card A because the
merchant discount on card A is high, and accepting only card B. This merchant
must primarily worry about whether owners of card A also hold card B; that is, if
there is membership multi-homing.19 Recent empirical work shows that there is
much more membership multi-homing than usage multi-homing.20
A second and familiar reason why no magic number can be expected to come
out of such foreclosure measurement is that the relevant share depends on the
impact of foreclosure (i.e. on the analysis of competitive effects—step 2).
Figure 5 summarizes the discussion in this section.
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18 For example, few would argue that the tie of Windows and WordPad affects/forecloses over 90 per-
cent of the market for word-processing software.
19 Things are a bit more complex if card A gives cash-back bonuses or frequent-flyer miles and cardhold-
ers know which cards are accepted before they choose their store: see Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean
Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J.
ECON. 1, 1-22 (2002); Rochet & Tirole, supra note 13.
20 Mark Rysman, An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage (mimeograph, Boston University, 2004).
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IV. Step 2: Is the Tie Likely to Hurt Consumers?
Assume that the step 1 analysis led to the conclusion that the tie reduces com-
petition in the tied segment. Regardless, it may hurt or benefit consumers; the tie
may or may not have anticompetitive rationales. 
A. RATIONALES OTHER THAN ANTICOMPETITIVE ONES
First list rationales that are not related to anticompetitive motives. These
include rationales clearly aimed at improving efficiency and others, such as price
discrimination, that a priori have an ambiguous impact on welfare.
1. Distribution Cost Savings
Peugeot and buyers of Peugeot bicycles both benefit from Peugeot’s tie of the ring
bell, saddle, brakes, and other equipment, even though this tie forecloses rival
equipment manufacturers’ access to Peugeot bicycles. Similarly, a three-star restau-
rant chef and her customers both benefit from the customers’ inability to select
among the pastries of all top pastry shops in the region. As Michael Whinston notes
Jean Tirole
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in a paper21 published in 2001, it suffices to consider the effect of a rule mandating
that all functions of Windows be available separately to understand why some inte-
gration of functionality is both desirable and inevitable. Tying is a ubiquitous fea-
ture of economic activities, simply because it economizes on transaction costs.
2. Compatibility Cost Savings
Similarly, it may be costly for the producer of the basic good (M) to achieve com-
patibility with competitors in all competitive segments. For example, Airbus and
Renault must ensure seamless interoperability between the various embedded
systems, engines, brakes, and other equipment. Extending this interoperability to
multiple outside vendors of these products requires fixing in advance, exposing,
and documenting a large number of interfaces. The transaction costs involved in
ensuring compatibility range from minuscule (as for the compatibility between
the saddle and the bicycle) to substantial. Their assessment is clearly case-specif-
ic and largely beyond the economist’s expertise.
3. Information and Liability Considerations
Tying is one way of telling consumers that a complementary good functions ade-
quately with the basic good. To be certain, it is not the only way, as we can see
from the widespread practice of endorsing complementary products as recom-
mended by M. More importantly, a tie may be used to protect M’s reputation vis-
à-vis consumers or to insulate M against assignment of liability when a product
malfunctions because of an independent producer’s poor design. A tie can then
be viewed as solving a problem of moral hazard in teams when third parties (such
as consumers or the courts) do not have the technical expertise or the informa-
tion necessary to know who is at fault.
4. Protection of Intellectual Property
Achieving perfect compatibility may also require releasing proprietary informa-
tion embodied in the design of the M product, such as information about gener-
al purpose functionalities that naturally lie in product M rather than in the com-
plementary product C. Suppose, for example, that Coca-Cola and rivals would
like to produce a cookie that tastes particularly good when consumed jointly
with a Coke; and that, in order to produce such cookies, one needs to know the
ingredients in the Coke formula so as to match them well on the cookie side.
Creating a level playing field in the cookie segment would require relinquishing
the trade secret that made Coca-Cola successful. This contrived example makes
a more general point, one that confronts antitrust authorities with a case-by-case
technical challenge. They need to assemble factual knowledge as to whether the
complementarities between the two segments can be exploited without an
infringement on intellectual property.
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21 Michael Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. vs Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know, 15 J.
ECON. PERSP. 63, 63-80 (2001).
22 For a discussion of welfare effects of price discrimination in a tying context, see Nalebuff, supra note 2.
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5. Legitimate Price Response
Low prices (even zero or negative ones) need not reflect anticompetitive intents
in certain environments. We already mentioned the idea that a low price may
boost demand in a complementary segment. A case in point is the strategy of giv-
ing away the razor in order to sell razor blades. We also refer the reader to our
previous discussion of two-sided markets, where we argued that it often makes
good business sense—and, importantly, is socially efficient—to give away the
product or service to one side of the market and to make money on the other
side. Alternatively, penetration pricing may be used for a product with unknown
quality in order to induce consumers to try it, or else, in order to build an
installed base in a market with network externalities.
As we noted earlier, charging a low price for the competitive good is not very
different from bundling the goods together, at least if the complementary good has
little value unless used in combination with M. Hence, a tie may in some circum-
stances be viewed as a legitimate price response in a competitive environment.
6. Market Segmentation
A well-known rationale for tying is that a tie enables the metering of demand
and prices to depend on consumer usage. Textbook examples of this rationale
include IBM’s tie of punched cards with computers and equipment manufactur-
ers’ tie of after-market services.
When the basic good (M) is consumed in a fixed amount while the comple-
mentary good’s (C) consumption varies across individuals, profit maximization,
usually in addition to economic efficiency, requires that high-usage consumers be
charged substantially more than low-usage ones. This pricing structure may not be
feasible when the complementary segment is served by a competitive industry. A
foreclosing tie enables the manufacturer of the basic good to meter demand and
practice a potentially socially desirable segmentation of consumers.22
Similarly, suppose that some consumers use M on a stand-alone basis while
others use M in combination with C or C′. Under unbundling, the producer of
M is forced to charge a single price for M, even though the two groups’ willing-
ness to pay may be quite distinct. For example, if consumers without demand for
the complementary product have a low willingness to pay for M, the producer of
M may end up charging a high price for M and prevent them from consuming.
By contrast, a tie enables the producer of M to charge a low price for the basic
good and a high price for the combination, which avoids excluding the first
group and raises economic efficiency. 
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23 Consistently with the object of our analysis, we here focus on anticompetitive rationales in the con-
text of complementary products. A large literature, including Whinston’s seminal paper (Michael
Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 837, 837–859 (1990)) and Nalebuff
(Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Deterrent Device, 119 Q. J. ECON. 159, 188 (2004)) has looked at
broader contexts, in which tying reduces entrant profits in the tied market and thereby may deter
entry, regardless of the existence of complementarities between the tying and the tied products.
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To be sure, price discrimination in general has an ambiguous impact on con-
sumers, and putting price discrimination by a dominant firm in a legitimate
rationale category is bound to be controversial, especially in view of EC law that
frowns upon the practice. The economic profession as a whole, however, has a
more lenient attitude toward price discrimination than policymakers. A reason-
able stance is a rule of reason treatment demonstrating that the negative effects
of price discrimination by a dominant firm are likely to dominate its benefits.
B. ANTICOMPETITIVE RATIONALES 
The main impact of the tie and its potential exclusionary impact may be not so
much to enhance efficiency, as described above, but rather to hurt rival producers
in the competitive market, thereby inducing their exit or discouraging their entry.
To build a theory of anticompetitive tying, one must somehow explain why (a)
tying benefits the integrated firm and (b) tying hurts consumers. Simple elimi-
nation of competition will not do for a well-known reason. Because goods C and
C′ are complements to M, making the adjacent good less attractive to con-
sumers—perhaps by eliminating competition or reducing innovation in that seg-
ment—lowers the price that the integrated firm can charge for M. In general, the
integrated firm benefits from vigorous competition in the potentially competi-
tive segment, not the reverse. This is why open platforms in videogame, hard-
ware, and software markets, for instance, have often taken over closed ones, for
which adjacent segments are supplied in-house. This argument, often called a
Chicago School argument, does not imply that firms with market power in one
segment always long for competition in adjacent segments. Indeed, we have
already seen that efficiency considerations may call against such competition.
We now observe that anticompetitive motives may also be present. The main
point of the Chicago School argument is that a simple-minded analysis that
would stop at step 1 of the checklist would be misguided.
There are two reasons why the producer of M may want to engage in such anti-
competitive behavior.23 It may try to monopolize the competitive market; or it
may want to protect its monopoly position in the monopoly segment.
The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer
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1. Monopolizing the Competitive Segment
Suppose now that there are two types of consumers: 
• some consume the combination {M combined with either C or C′}
and have no value for C or C′ on a stand-alone basis,
• others consume the competitive good {C or C′} on a stand-alone basis
and are uninterested in M.
By refusing to offer M on a stand-alone basis (or, equivalently, by selling it at a
high price), the integrated firm excludes rival producers in the competitive mar-
ket from access to consumers who demand the combination. This strategy direct-
ly hurts the integrated firm since the lack of consumer choice between C and C′
(when combined with M) reduces the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for M. Here, exclusion is not motivated by any
efficiency consideration.
The exclusionary strategy may, however indirectly,
benefit the integrated firm if, following the tie, the rivals’
profit in the market for the consumers who demand only
C or C′ is no longer sufficient to cover their fixed costs of
operation, and, thus, rivals exit the competitive market,
allowing the integrated firm to monopolize that market as
well.24,25 In the parlance of predation analysis, the inte-
grated firm sacrifices profit on consumers who consume both goods jointly and
recoups this lost profit by charging more to consumers who demand solely the
potentially competitive good.
2. Protecting the Monopoly Segment
Alternatively, the integrated firm may be concerned about the possibility that
a product competing with M will later enter the market. To the extent that the
two goods are demanded in combination rather than on a stand-alone basis,
entry in the M market may be somewhat discouraged by the absence of inde-
pendent complementary product C′. Hence a strategy that encourages produc-
ers of C′ to exit (or discourages them from entering) while lowering profit in
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24 See Michael Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. vs Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know,
15 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 63-80 (2001). Whinston notes that a variant of this argument involves dynamic
network externalities in the competitive market: C′ having no market today due to the tie may want
to exit even if the tie will come to an end, since there will be little demand for C′ tomorrow in the
absence of an installed base.
25 Under what conditions can the exclusionary strategy be profitable? Exclusion deprives the rivals
from substantial profits if the rivals’ offerings C′ are sufficiently differentiated from C and if the num-
ber of consumers demanding the combination is large; on the other hand, these conditions also
increase the integrated firm’s direct cost of tying. See also Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion, supra note 23.
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the short run, may protect the monopoly segment and increase the integrated
firm’s long-run profitability.26 This is the standard applications barriers to entry
theory.27
Whether tying aims at monopolizing the competitive segment or at protecting
the monopoly segment, the incriminated behavior is really predation rather than
tying, per se. The tie is just one strategy used to achieve predation and to induce
exit or deter entry. This refocusing on predation has several implications. First,
authorities should use the standard procedure for the analysis of predation.28
Steps 1 and 2 would still figure prominently in the process, and the standard
recoupment test can be added to the checklist: To the extent that the tying firm
does not engage in tying for efficiency reasons and, therefore, makes its tying
product less attractive to its consumers, does the prospect of future gains from
successful predation offset the current losses?
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26 Dennis Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power
in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 194-220 (2002). For a somewhat different approach
(based on the idea that entry is risky and that entering in two markets simultaneously is riskier than
entering a single one), see J.P. Choi & C. Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage
Theory, 32 RAND J. ECON. 52, 52-71 (2001). This application barriers to entry theory holds for example
if the producers of C′ fail to anticipate entry in the M market (an hypothesis that is more plausible if
there are many complementary markets affected by a tie with M, as there is then a coordination prob-
lem in which firms’ entry decision are interrelated), and that entrants in the M market be unable or
unwilling to supply their own offering in the complementary segment. The argument however does
not rely on a lack of coordination: see next footnote. The welfare analysis is not straightforward; by
assumption, anti-competitive theories presume large fixed costs in the competitive segment.
Competition in that segment involves a social trade-off between low prices and product diversity on
the one hand, and the duplication of these large fixed costs on the other hand.
27 Some mathematics may help illustrate this point. Suppose for simplicity that consumers are homoge-
nous and derive gross surpluses M, C, and C′ from goods M, C and C′ (when combined with M in the
case of C and C′). The marginal costs of production are denoted m, c, and c′. Assume that C′ domi-
nates C in that it offers a better quality / cost package:
∆ / (C′ – C) + (c – c′) > 0
∆ measures the competitive advantage of C′ over C. Suppose that there are two dates (today and
tomorrow) and no discounting, and that an entrant can enter and produce C′ already today at fixed
R&D cost f
C








then a tie today deters entry in both markets, as it deprives the rival from today’s profit in the C seg-
ment and makes the overall entry strategy a losing proposition. (A technical aside: with the above
specification of demands, there exist multiple price equilibria in the first period. I assume that the
entrant appropriates the full comparative advantage ∆ in that period. The analysis however does not
rest on this assumption.)
28 In this respect, note the divide between the European Community and the United States with regards
to the opportunity of a recoupment test. The European Court of Justice more or less argued in Tetra
Pak that dominance implies an ability to recoup, and therefore that a recoupment test is not needed.
In the United States, the Supreme Court used a recoupment test in Brooke Group. For a discussion of
the intricacies associated with a recoupment test, see J. Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, Address to
31st EARIE Conference (Sep. 3, 2004).
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V. Costs and Benefits of a Predation-Based
Treatment
To be sure, my suggestion of discarding tying cases as such and reclassifying them
as predatory cases has the advantage of refocusing and clarifying the economic
analysis, but it has its own limitations, which are those inherent in the treatment
of predation in general. First, there is the familiar but difficult question of the allo-
cation of the burden of proof. Antitrust authorities may not know whether an
apparently innocent conduct (i.e. one that a priori benefits consumers, such as
charging a low price, reducing production cost, or engaging in an efficient tie) is
not also meant to induce rivals’ exit. Conversely, it may be difficult for the defen-
dant to prove that his action (here, tying) is driven by efficiency rather than by
predatory intent. Second, even if the competition authorities and the court had all
the required information (a big “if”), their current mandate gives them insufficient
guidance for treating predation cases. By analogy with price predation, one could
identify non-price predation as a voluntary and temporary loss in profit that can be
rationalized only through a contemplated and substantial increase in the rivals’
probability of exit and the subsequent ability to recoup losses. This, up to informa-
tional requirements, defines an operational approach to treating non-price preda-
tion, although, as is discussed next, not one that is immune to criticism.29
A. MIXTURE OF EFFICIENCY AND ANTICOMPETITIVE RATIONALES 
We need to devote more attention to the following issue: suppose that one is con-
cerned that a lack of independent suppliers (of C′) in the adjacent markets will,
by itself, perpetuate M’s monopoly position. Should policymakers impose lines of
business restrictions preventing M from entering specific adjacent segments, a
policy that would require defining such segments and rigidifying the platform? Or,
more realistically, should they take steps to prevent the integrated firm from dom-
inating the adjacent markets? If so, what steps? The integrated firm may end up
dominating an adjacent market for reasons unrelated to anticompetitive intents:
efficiency, innovation, or mere discouragement of rivals, who under pressure from
even an inferior offering of the integrated firm, cannot secure margins sufficient-
ly in excess of marginal cost to cover their fixed cost. Increased efficiency by the
integrated firm may indeed have the potential to eliminate rivals, all the more so
in markets with large fixed costs and/or prone to tipping. 
Thus, a complex situation arises when the incriminated behavior is driven
both by efficiency and anticompetitive rationales. With tying, as with other cor-
porate strategies, a behavior that excludes rivals may actually be optimal for the
dominant firm, even taking rivals’ actions as given. Put differently, predation
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29 As Vickers argues in a broader context, anchoring case analysis in economic principle (what he calls
“economics-based law”) may provide more legal certainty than “form-based law” (see Vickers, supra
note 28).
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does not always imply a cost for the predator; yet, the efficiency gains may be
more than offset by the increase in future monopoly power from a social perspec-
tive. The possibility of no-cost predation (an oxymoron according to the current
legal treatment of predation, which emphasizes the existence of a profit sacrifice
to drive out rivals) poses a general and complex challenge to antitrust enforcers.
Weighing the two opposite effects is a tough call. On the one hand, one may be
worried that too many anticompetitive moves would pass muster with a rule that
finds such mixed-rationales moves innocent. On the other hand, firms should
have no duty to be inefficient simply to maintain their rivals’ existence; such a
duty would, for example, often prevent dominant firms from improving their pro-
ductivity, or would force them to charge high prices to consumers so as to pro-
vide a price umbrella to their rivals. It is easy to envision the potential perverse
effects of such an approach in the absence of clear guidance on how to run it.
B. PASS ON AND BALANCING TESTS
A different issue arises as to how one should weigh profits and consumer surplus
when trading off efficiency gains and reductions in competition. Economists
often add these two variables in order to measure total welfare. By contrast,
antitrust enforcers traditionally focus on consumer welfare. For example, the
interpretation of Article 81(3) in the European Community30 has led practition-
ers to envision a pass on test and a balancing test. In short, some of the efficien-
cy gain must be passed on to consumers and the latter’s benefit must outweigh
the loss from competition. The interpretation, therefore, lies in the tradition of
focusing on the impact of the practice on consumer surplus.
There are arguments either way. On the one hand, one may for redistribution
reasons legitimately feel that consumers weigh more than shareholders, who usu-
ally belong to much higher income brackets. However, the argument is not as
straightforward as it looks. First, there is the usual question about whether redis-
tribution is not best performed through income taxation rather than through
specific instruments.31 Second, consumers are often shareholders as well, espe-
cially in countries with well-developed pension funds.
30 This article opens the door to exempting a practice “which contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.”
31 See the large literature following the Atkinson & Stiglitz theorem stating conditions under which
redistribution should be conducted solely through income taxation. See A.B. Atkinson & J. Stiglitz, The
Design of Tax Structure: Direct and Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 55-75.
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One can also argue that, by properly choosing the horizon of analysis, count-
ing profits is, in some circumstances, akin to accounting for consumer surplus.
This point of view is actually implicit in a number of branches of law. It under-
lies much of intellectual property law, which explicitly allows intellectual prop-
erty owners to engage ex post in a variety of foreclosure and anticompetitive
moves; the reasoning being that, from an ex ante point of view, this leniency cre-
ates incentives for innovation and ultimately benefits consumers. Similarly,
antitrust acceptance of prices largely in excess of marginal cost32 reflects the gen-
erally accepted view that such margins are what it takes to encourage invest-
ments in industries with large fixed costs.
C. MEASURING LOSS
To simplify somewhat, tying can be viewed as charging a zero price for the tied
product. While antitrust analysis usually compares price to some notion of mar-
ginal cost,33 it is also well-known that this comparison is theoretically problem-
atic. Namely, the proper benchmark may lie below or above marginal costs. In
the absence of predatory intent, firms may charge below marginal cost for sever-
al reasons: penetration pricing when the quality is unknown to consumers, learn-
ing-by-doing (i.e. current sales reduce future costs), multi-sidedness (i.e. a loss on
one side boosts volume and thereby demand on the other side of the market—
see Section III) or more generally network externalities. Conversely, a price
above marginal cost, but below the short-term profit maximizing price may suf-
fice to induce rivals to exit (or deter them from entering).
VI. Concluding Comments
A. STEP 3: REMEDIES
Suppose, finally, that one comes to the conclusion that the tie is likely to elimi-
nate competition (step 1) and that its rationale is anticompetitive (step 2). One
is then confronted by the complex step of finding a proper remedy. The anticom-
petitive tying theories and, in particular, the theory stressing an applications bar-
riers to entry, suggest that antitrust authorities ought to intervene in order to
maintain active competition in components (i.e. to keep C′ alive).
As argued above, the anticompetitive harm, if any, comes from a predatory act,
not from tying, per se. Like low prices, ties may be perfectly legitimate strategies,
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32 In Europe, though, excessive pricing can in principle breach competition law. But see Vickers, supra
note 28 (“nearly all European cases have concerned exclusionary, rather than directly exploitative,
conduct”).
33 For a discussion of the relevant concept of “marginal cost,” see P. Bolton, J. Brodley & M. Riordan, A
Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L. J. 2239, 2239-2330.
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even for dominant firms; it is only to the extent that they are turned into preda-
tory tools that they become a concern. Consequently, the remedy has to be con-
sidered in its broader context. Suppose that tying is the least costly instrument
of predation for the dominant firm. Its prohibition may well induce the domi-
nant firm to resort to other forms of predation that are both privately and social-
ly more costly. For example, it may try to degrade interconnectivity with its rivals
in the tied market, promote its version of the tied product in inefficient ways, or,
in a two-sided market, enter into exclusive contracts with the other side that are
unrelated to efficiency considerations. This remark further emphasizes the limits
of treating tying cases as such.
B. SYSTEM VERSUS COMPONENT COMPETITION 
Given that competition policy officials, however talented and well-intentioned,
will always face substantial imperfections in information, many economists feel that
encouraging system competition, when feasible, is a superior alternative to the reg-
ulation of component competition. That is, it may be better to encourage some
competition in the M segment than to accept monopoly there and attempt to reg-
ulate the consequences in the C segment. This diffidence vis-à-vis the regulation of
component competition also underlies much of public policy in concentrated indus-
tries. Increasing returns to scale and/or network externalities limit the number of
relevant actors in a number of industries. As examples, there are currently two com-
mercial aircraft manufacturers in the world; in many locations a single provider of
local loop telecommunication infrastructure; or in many rural areas a single super-
market. Public policy has not sought to unbundle space on Wal-Mart shelves or the
equipment in Airbus and Boeing aircraft. There is a continuing debate between the
proponents of a fine unbundling of the local loop and those in favor of a wholesale
rental of the local loop to alternative telecommunications operators.
These policies are predicated on the view that detailed and intrusive regula-
tion is likely to do as much harm as good under poor regulatory information, and
that system competition, or at least system contestability—that is, the ability of
entrants to enter if the incumbent monopoly fails to innovate and/or abuses his
monopoly position—is a superior alternative when available. They also reflect
the fact that, contrary to what is sometimes believed, system competition does
not necessarily restrict the set of options offered to consumers compared with
component competition. The benefits from bundling, or equivalently the costs
attached to unbundling, imply that some combinations available under system
competition would be either unavailable or available at a significantly higher
price under component competition, for the same reason that made-to-measure
clothes typically cost much more than those available off-the-hanger.
The caveat to this view is precisely the applications barriers to entry argument,
which points out that system contestability may require vibrant competition in
at least some key components. The debate is therefore an industry-specific,
empirical one: To what extent is the exit—or lack of entry—of rival component
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manufacturers conducive to a loss of expertise by the component industry out-
side the integrated firm? 
C. SUMMING UP
A brief summary of the arguments made in this primer follows:
• The impact of tying on competition in the tied market ranges from lit-
tle impact on the rivals’ ability to compete to total exclusion of com-
petitors. Where it stands in that range depends on a number of factors:
the marginal cost of manufacturing the tied product; the rivals’ ability
to differentiate horizontally or vertically their offering from the tied
product—that is, to offer some features that are not available in the
tied product; and, if the market is multi-sided, the ability to differenti-
ate, in the side where there is no tie, through technological features,
in-house supply, or exclusive contracts with third-party vendors, and
the ease with which users on the tying side can multi-home.
• Tying should be submitted to a rule of reason standard. Firms with mar-
ket power may engage in a tie in order either to monopolize the com-
petitive segment or to protect their monopoly power in the monopoly
segment. But, like firms without substantial market power, they also use
ties for a variety of reasons that enhance economic efficiency (i.e. dis-
tribution or compatibility cost savings, accountability, protection of
intellectual property, or legitimate price responses), or at worst have
ambiguous effects on social welfare (i.e. price discrimination).
• It is difficult to think of reasons that tying should be considered a
separate offense. Like many other corporate strategies that make one’s
products attractive to consumers, tying has the potential of hurting
competitors, and is, therefore, just one in a large range of strategies
that can be employed to prey on competitors. Competition policy
should therefore analyze tying cases through the more general lens of a
predation test. 
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